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Abstract
There is a strong foundation on which to reestablish a local government system in Nepal. Nepal
society is constituted and strengthened by strong community traditions. Likewise,
decentralization has existed historically. Nepali State is at a crucial moment. After remaining a
unitary and centralist state for about 240 years of its formation, a new constitution is being
written by Nepali people through the Constituent Assembly (CA). The Interim Constitution
directs that Nepal will be a federal democratic republican state. In order to institutionalize the
directives, different committees of the CA have been drafting the constitution along the federal
line. Traditionally, federalism stood for two tiers of government: central and regional/state.
Local governments were left under domain of the state governments. However, recognizing their
tremendous importance in institutionalizing democracy and improving service delivery, local
governments are now being specifically provided for in the constitution.
As the country goes through this historic period, a review of the state of decentralization and
service delivery shows that a serious discussion will be required on the functioning of legitimate
local governments. Local governments will require support to dispense their roles and
responsibilities. Local governments will require greater local autonomy and building around
them systems of accountability to ensure effective and efficient service delivery. Citizens will
require empowerment to hold elected representatives, local government authorities and
providers accountable. This paper shows that service delivery is still weak, and that addressing
the challenges will require addressing the weaknesses in accountability relationships. Carefully
designed decentralization and sequencing of decentralization reforms will be a key challenge
during this transition. A key lesson is that political economy and economic/resource
considerations will remain critical in the debate of what the federal structure in Nepal will look
like.
Key words: Fiscal Federalism, Decentralization, Service Delivery
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1.

Introduction
The present form of Nepali state was created in 1769 by unifying many small and large

principalities. Since 1769 to 2008, the country remained a kingdom and the dynasty that led the
unification process headed the state. In terms of exercising executive powers, the country
witnessed different forms of rules and forms of governance ranging from direct rule by the king
to hereditary prime minister to absolute monarchy parliamentary form of government. Despite
different forms of rules, the country remained unitary and highly centralized.
Currently, Nepali people are writing their constitution through the Constituent Assembly
(CA) which has been a longstanding demand of Nepali people. The election of the CA was held
in the backdrop of the historic people' movement in 2006 and a decade long Maoist insurgency
preceding the movement. The Interim Constitution declares Nepal a federal democratic republic
and the CA is writing the constitution along the federal line. The Constitution justifies federalism
as a means to end ethnic, cultural, linguistic, geographical and class-related...discrimination that
has been practiced by the establishment. One of the major reasons why people belonging to
particular ethnic, linguistic, geographic, cultural communities felt discriminated by the regime is
the poor state of public service delivery.
Nepal is a late starter in terms of providing public services to the general people. Before
1951, Nepal was ruled by a family autocracy and there was no question of providing public
services to the people; all the machinery was devoted to please the rulers, who were not
accountable to the people. There were a number of schools and hospitals but were accessible by
a few. It was only after 1951-- the year when the autocracy was over--that the government
started thinking of providing basic services to the people. Between these decades, tremendous
2

changes have taken place in terms of increasing access to the basic services and improving the
living standard of the people.
With respect to access, despite its tough geographic terrain, Nepal has recorded
remarkable progress in improving access to basic public services. The latest Nepal Standard
Survey (NLSS) revealed that by 2004-05, 91 and 63 percent of households had primary schools
and health posts/sub-health posts, respectively, within 30 minutes of travel time (CBS, 2004).
Likewise, 37 and 44 percent households had access to electricity and piped water, respectively,
during the same time. The private sector is also expanding its investments in sectors like health
and education.
Despite these developments, Nepal still faces challenges in public service delivery. A
sizeable number of people do not yet have access to basic public services. It is not uncommon to
find people who have hardly had access to basic public services. Likewise, the efficiency and
quality of the services being delivered is still generally low. Some health facilities, for example,
are devoid of essential medicines and equipment or the medical personnel to work at the
facilities. This poor state of service delivery has been a cause of public concern.
Both central government (CG) and local bodies (LBs) are responsible for providing
services. The role of the CG in service delivery is critical, since it has the lead role in policy
formulation, financing, regulation and actual delivery. However, the delivery of the CG has not
been as efficient and effective, as would be desired, owing in part to a long chain involved from
policy formulation to service delivery, lack of local control, poor match between financial
allocation and local preferences, among others. In recent years, the role of the LBs in service
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delivery has substantially increased. Yet, they are yet to be established as institutions of public
service delivery.
During the ongoing constitution writing process in Nepal, an opportune moment presents
to lay down fundamental principles and policies in the constitution to ensure efficient and
effective service delivery in the future. In particular, the role and responsibilities of the local
governments (LGs) will have to be carefully incorporated in the constitution, enabling them to be
developed as governments closest to the people and a provider of local public goods.
The essence of a federal form of governance is to empower people by devolving power to
the lowest level of government, which will be best suited to provide local services in an efficient
and effective manner. However, this role of the LGs has not been fully discussed and deliberated
to perhaps inform the constitution writing process. Much of the debate has centered on the
division of roles and responsibilities between the central and state governments. Against this
background, this paper briefly analyzes the state of service delivery in Nepal and discusses some
measures to improve service delivery under a federal structure.
2.

Framework
Increasingly Governments in developing countries are paying significant attention to

improving the delivery of public services. As a key aspect of governance, decentralization is one
of the policy instruments attempted by several countries worldwide trying to improve service
delivery. Several countries have attempted to transfer responsibilities of the state to lower tiers of
government. Significantly, most of these lower tier governments have been elected, so that the
decentralization is not just administrative or fiscal, but also political.
4

It is argued that local governments could better undertake local public good provision, as
it would eventually lead to a better match of political power and incentives to ensure effective
delivery. Decentralization could lead to increased devolution of financial resources to subnational governments, which in turn might imply increased allocation of resources to sectors,
such as education and health. Decentralization can achieve several other objectives such as:
severing as a path to national unity (e.g. South Africa); may offer a political solution to civil war
(e.g. Bosnia–Herzegovina, Sudan); may serve as an instrument to deflate secessionist tendencies
(e.g. Ethiopia), or formally forestalling the decision as to whether or not to secede. Countries that
are ethnically diverse and territorially concentrated may wish to find ways of working together to
provide public services effectively and in this sense decentralization may serve an opportunity
(Ahmad et al 2006).
Achieving accountable and efficient local governments takes time; thus decentralization
is not a one-off policy change (Box 1). For example, development of sufficient and effective
capacity support to manage local governments may take decades to achieve. It is a process of
learning by doing with adjustments and fine tuning in of the policy levers as implementation
continues. The ultimate outcome of the decentralization process is influenced by the way
decentralization is implemented, the political process, and the form of decentralization
implemented.
Bahl et al (2006) discuss that proper implementation of decentralization calls for better
sequencing of the decentralization reform process. Ideally, subnational governments should first
be given clarity about their functions and associated expenditure responsibilities and, based on
these, the proper assignment and design of tax instruments and transfer systems should be made.
5

The rule that finance follows function appropriately defines this sequencing. In addition, to
ensure service delivery and the exercise of devolved powers in general, administrative
decentralization should be implemented along with expenditure and fiscal arrangements. So
function, finance, and functionaries all need to be sequenced properly. A complete framework of
decentralization would seek to address specific issues of overall intergovernmental structure,
including the number and size of tiers, the linkage between the center and each tier, expenditure
and revenue assignments, fiduciary systems, and fiscal and service delivery monitoring systems.
All these elements will involve a gradual process and political debate.
Box 1: Fostering Debate on Decentralization
Decentralization is a dynamic process. No country ever gets it right on its first try. Circumstances
change, and the nature and design of intergovernmental fiscal relations should change also. An
important aspect of establishing an adequate institutional framework for decentralization is thus to
build in some ‘error‐correction’ mechanism, that is, to permit and encourage the adaptive
development and evolution of the system in response to changes in needs and capacities (Bird,
2001)."
Bardhan (2006) concludes that it is quite plausible to argue that in the matter of service deliveries
as well as in local business development, control rights in governance structures should be assigned
to people who have the requisite information and incentives, and at the same time will bear
responsibility for the (political and economic) consequences of their decisions. In many situations
this calls for more devolution of power to local authorities and communities. But at the same time
it is important to bear in mind that structures of local accountability are not in place in many
developing countries, and local governments are often at the mercy of local power elites, who may
frustrate the goal of achieving public delivery to the general populace of social services,
infrastructural facilities and conditions conducive to local business development. (In other cases
the elite may secede from the system of public services and the political support base of the latter
may collapse.) This means that decentralization to be really effective has to be accompanied by
serious attempts to change the existing structures of power within communities and to improve
the opportunities for participation and voice, and engaging the hitherto disadvantaged or
disenfranchised in the political process.
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Recent political economy literature analyzes how decentralization will improve outcomes
to the extent that physical proximity increases voter information, citizen participation and
monitoring of performance, and to the extent that narrowing the scope of responsibilities of each
tier of government decision makers reduces their ability to shirk on some responsibilities by
performing better on others.
Analyzing the nexus of decentralization thus requires a better understanding of
relationships of accountability among all stakeholders in a particular country. Decentralization
introduces a new relationship of accountability – between national and local policy makers –
while also altering existing relationships, such as that between citizens and elected politicians.
Only by examining how these relationships change can we understand why decentralization can,
and sometimes cannot, lead to better service delivery. In particular, the various instruments of
decentralization—fiscal administrative, regulatory, market and financial—can affect the
incentives facing service providers, even though they relate only to local policy makers.
Likewise, and perhaps more significantly the incentives facing local and national politicians can
have a profound effect on the provision of local services.
The WDR (2004) provides a framework for analyzing these relationships of
accountability. This framework is summarized in Figure 1. Service improvements are more
likely when there are strong relationships of accountability between the actors in the service
delivery chain. These actors include providers, clients and policy makers. The short route is the
accountability relationship going directly from the client to the service provider. Clients hold
service providers responsible for service provision. The long route of accountability is the
indirect accountability relationship that goes from the client to politicians and then to the service
7

provider, the client having indirect accountability over the service provider. Clients appeal to
politicians for improving service provision and politicians hold service providers accountable for
performance. Clients thus punish or reward politicians for performance and politicians punish or
reward service providers for performance based on the signals clients give to politicians.
Weaknesses in service-delivery outcomes can be attributed to a breakdown in either the short
route or the long route (or both).
[Figure 1]
The next section borrows some of the principles outlined in the framework to take a
closer look at the state of decentralization and service delivery in Nepal.
3. Overview of decentralization in Nepal
Nepal has two tiers of LBs: districts and locals. At the local level, there have been
separate arrangements for urban and rural areas. Village Development Committees (VDCs) are
for rural areas and municipalities for urban areas. VDCs and municipalities are further divided
into wards. At the district level, District Development Committees (DDCs) have been in place.
The LBs are recognized as autonomous and corporate bodies with perpetual succession and are
to be headed by elected representatives.
Nepal has a long history with attempts on decentralization. Politically elected local
representatives were in place as early as the sixties. At that time, decentralization was regarded
as a process to mobilize people's participation in development (GON& ADB, 2008). Their major
competency included judicial powers related to settling of local disputes and hence lacked rights
and responsibilities to provide local public goods. Prior to the 1990s (under the monarchy), there
8

was limited support of true decentralization. The country experienced political change in 1990
resulting in the restoration of multiparty democracy. However, even the Constitution of the
Kingdom of Nepal that was promulgated after the restoration of multiparty democracy did not
duly recognize the role of local governments.
Fiscal decentralization is rather a recent occurrence in Nepal. The Local Self-Governance
Act (LSGA), 1999 for the first time systematically provided for separate expenditure and
revenue assignments to DDCs, municipalities, and VDCs based on the principles of fiscal
decentralization. The Act provides a relatively long list of expenditures assigned to the LBs that
are related to almost every aspect of daily lives of citizens at local level ranging from education
to health to water supply and sanitation to agriculture. It devolves a number of revenue sources
to these bodies. In most of the sources, rates are defined and in some cases the LBs can define
their own rates. The Act provides that the LBs will get minimum and additional grants from the
central governments. In theory, LBs have also been allowed to borrow by depositing their
property if that is backed by the central government. At the time of the enactment of the law,
Nepal had set itself high standards in South Asia region in terms of providing statutory rights and
responsibilities to the LBs.
After the LSGA has been implemented, a number of positive developments have taken
place. The LBs have taken on responsibilities in a number of areas that were hitherto under the
domain of the central government. They have started constructing local infrastructure on a
massive scale and providing social services (MLD, 2010). They have also initiated both periodic
and annual planning exercises, which are aimed at enabling the local communities to reveal their
preferences and prioritize. Local people, at least in urban areas, are increasingly becoming aware
9

that they have to pay for the services they receive. The central government increased the amount
of resources provided to the LBs as a way of empowering them (Table 1).
The VDCs have been receiving the highest amount of grants followed by municipalities
and DDCs. However, the grants system remained ad hoc for a long time and since FY 2008/09
the government has tried to make it formula based (MLD & LBFC, 2010). The grant allocation
has been based on geographic area, cost index, population, poverty, and a human development
index (HDI). Overall, the amount of grants transferred to the LBs as a percentage of the central
government's budgeted expenditure has remained a little more than 5 percent in recent years.
These positive developments notwithstanding, decentralization in Nepal has been far
from complete for a number of reasons. To begin with, the LBs' roles and responsibilities do not
have constitutional backing. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 and its predecessor
appreciated the importance of decentralization. However, it was confined to the Directive
Principles of State Policy, which is not enforceable by the law. Because of this, it took almost a
decade (in 1999) to enact the law empowering the LBs with relatively more roles and
responsibilities. It may be noted that in many mature democracies decentralization has taken
place without constitutional guarantee. However, in nascent democracies such as Nepal, the
success of decentralization may in part hinge on the constitutional backing.
Second, the LBs have not been able to fully exercise the competencies as envisioned by
the Act (LBFC, 2004) for a number of reasons. The Act conflicted with many existing laws as
they provided many of the rights to the central government as well. At the time the legislation
was passed, it contradicted with 23 laws. Consequently, there are only a few items like
certification and recommendation, and waster management that are exclusively assigned to the
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LBs (LBFC, 2004); with the rest of them under the competencies of the central government and
the LBs. This duplication of the roles could have been avoided by devolution. Nevertheless, the
CG's intermittent efforts to fully or partially devolve proved to be only half-hearted. On the other
hand, the LGs were not in a position to unilaterally exercise the powers given to them by the Act.
Owing to this lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the LBs in many sectors,
the LBs seem to be interested in allocating budgets to those areas that are relatively clear. It is
claimed that DDCs and VDCs allocate a large part of their budgets in rural roads, and
municipalities in urban roads and sewerage (LBFC, 2004). They appear to be more hesitant to
spend in other sectors like education and health as the facilities even at VDC level are run by the
central government.
Third, the LBs' revenue base is weak and they have not fully utilized the bases given.
Despite a long list of revenues assigned, most of them are not revenue yielding. More
importantly, they have not been able to mobilize their revenue sources even where there is a
potential (LBFC, 2004; GoN &ADB, 2008) for different reasons. Since expenditure assignments
are not clear, LBs do not face a hard budget constraint. In other words, the LBs budget according
to what is available not according to what is needed. Likewise, until very recently the central
government provided grants to the LBs based on ad hoc procedures and thus, LBs had little
incentive in collecting taxes at local level. Generally, the revenue sources could not be mobilized
to realize more revenue at the local level.
Table 1 presents the total amount of revenue generated by the LBs over the years. It
shows that local taxes constitute less than one percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As a
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percentage of general government revenue, the share of revenue mobilized by the LBs is in the
range of 4 to 5 percent.
Fourth, the intergovernmental transfer system was not properly sequenced and it didn't
coincide with accountability measures. Principles of fiscal decentralization suggest that finance
should follow functions, meaning that lower tiers of government should be provided funds once
their expenditures are clearly assigned. However, the government started providing substantial
amount of grants before the LSGA was in place, when the LBs' role was even unclear and
limited. Owing to this, proper utilization of grants received may be limited. In some cases, it is
reported that the amount is allocated to the political and geographic areas pro rata (LBFC, 2004).
Fifth, staffing policy is not commensurate with the policy of decentralization. Currently,
the LBs have two types of staff: deputed by the central government and hired by the LBs. Chiefs
of all the LBs are to be deputed by the central government and the rest of staff are either deputed
or locally hired. VDC secretaries are hired and transferred by the central government and local
political officials have no control this regard, which in a way limits their accountability to the
local governments.
Sixth, decentralization is guided by the central government and LBs lack autonomy in
their operations. There are many guidelines in place that LBs have to follow. They range from
distribution of social security to commissioning social audit. Some of them, in particular those
related to carrying out delegated functions, can be justified, but not all of them. The LBs are even
controlled in hiring of staff the cost of which is to be borne by their own source (GoN and ADB,
2008). With respect to the grants being provided, unconditional grants too are followed by many
guidelines that the LBS have to comply with.
12

An interesting and striking point about the decentralization process is that even the
incomplete legislation could not be fully implemented. It was only for more than three years (till
July 2002) after the LSGA was enacted that the LBs were led by elected representatives. Yet, by
the time the Act was in place, the Maoist insurgency that began in 1996 had controlled a
significant part of rural Nepal and the LBs in those areas were no more fully functional. In
subsequent years, as the conflict intensified, the LBs in the rest of the country became virtually
non-functional. This suggests that even during 1999-2002 the LBs could not fully exercise their
authority. It should be pointed out that after 2002 the LBs are being led by civil servants deputed
by the central government.
4.

State of service delivery

Administratively Nepal is divided into five development regions, 14 zones, 75 districts,
3914 VDCs, and 58 municipalities. Most of the ministries have their offices at district level that
are key to delivering services under their jurisdictions. And, some of the district level offices
have their delivery units down to the VDC level. These service units are administratively and
financially controlled and managed by district level offices, that are in turn controlled by their
regional offices, departments and ministries. As for the local governments, they exist at district
level and below. DDCs function at district level and so do municipalities and VDCs in urban and
rural areas. Ilakas are constituted of a number of VDCs, but they do not have independent status.
The central government plays a significant role in providing public services. It provides
these services through ministries, departments, regional, district and VDC level offices. Several
public enterprises and other autonomous agencies are also involved in the service delivery
13

process. However, for a number of reasons this service delivery model not been able to rise up to
the challenges. First, a long chain is involved between the service delivery units at local levels
and the ministries in terms of budgeting, planning, programming and staffing. Budgets and
programs are to be approved at the central level and passed on to the lower level, a process
which takes significant amount of time. Despite improvements in recent years, annual budgets
and work plans do not reach the operational level on time. Second, because of the centralized
nature, there is very little scope for matching budget allocation and programming with local
needs. Thirdly, the local people and authorities have almost no control over the staff and budget
of the CG offices.
The quality of services being delivered by the central agencies is still low. In health, since
medicines to be provided even by the sub-health posts are centrally purchased and supplied, they
in some cases reach to the facilities late (Devekota, 2006). This is further exacerbated by the
acute absence of health personnel in their duty stations, both in remote villages and district
headquarters. Some positions of medical doctors in district hospitals are hardly fulfilled. This
may open possibilities for less competent staff to perform complicated and delicate medical
procedures (Box 2).
Box 2: X‐ray Machine operated by Peon
Rukum District Hospital's x‐ray machine is being operated by a peon for the last ten years in
the absence of a radiographer. Amar, the peon, has been working in the hospital for the last
20 years and has been running the machine for last 10 years. He learnt how to operate
themachine by working in two health camps and with that experience he started his job. Not
only that, he now repairs the machine. (Source: Kantipur, September 18, 2009).
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The situation in the education and agriculture sectors is not very different even though the
magnitude of the problem may vary because of the nature of the services in question.
Agriculture and livestock service facilities lack bare minimum equipment and other supplies
(GoN and ADB, 2008). The problem of absenteeism could be higher in agriculture sector than in
health sector. In education, it was reported that about 34 schools were facing the problem of
seepage in their classrooms and only 53 percent of schools had sufficient furniture (FCGO…).
There is also absenteeism of civil servants in their work stations. In Mugu, one of the
remotest districts, only three officers were in-charges out of 24 were present at their work
stations in May 2009 (Sharma Yam, field notes, 2009). When a team of the OPMCM went to a
few districts in the far west region in August 2009, only two officers in-charge—the Chief
District Officer (CDOs) and the Police Chief—were present. In Khotang district, 12 officers incharges of major services were away from their duty station (Kantipur, August 2009). The
national dailies often report that officers in-charge of various services at the district level are
away from their duty stations (although sometimes away on approved leave or attending training
workshops).

Box 3: Local Officials' Presence in Their Work Stations
Besides field piloting, the head of the DDC and the Municipality are least motivated to work in the
DDC and Municipality. This explains their long absence from the office for unknown reasons. Their
absence has become a rule rather than the exception. The VDC secretary and LDOs, particularly of
the remote hill and mountain areas, spend more than 75 % of their time outside the district/VDC
areas. The possible reasons for the absence include attending training workshops and other
official (?) business. Actual time available for the service seekers is far less than desired."
Source: GRDCP, 2008
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The recent cholera epidemic highlights systemic challenges in the service delivery chain.
In the summer of 2009, 398 people died of cholera (Kantipur, August, 26, 2009) in the Mid-West
Region, mainly in Jajarkot, Rukum and a number of other districts. The epidemic erupted in late
April and continued till the end of August. At the time of this epidemic there was a lack of health
personnel and essential medicines in some of the local health facilities in villages (Himal, 2009).
In Jajarkot District Hospital, only one doctor was present at the time out of four positions. The
response on the epidemic was slow. Later on health workers and medicines to these districts, but
they were not sufficient, and not timely.
With respect to the public services delivered by the LBs, the issues can broadly be
classified into two: scope and coverage, and efficiency. The LBs provide services in very limited
areas. The services exclusively provided by the LBs include issuing certificates related to vital
registration and recommendation, disposal of garbage and building permits. For the rest, they are
not obliged to perform and hence carry out those that they deem easier (LBFC, 2004). Further,
there are inefficiencies in the delivery of basic services. In the ensuing paragraphs the causes of
this state of affairs are enumerated.
Regarding scope and coverage, a number of factors have contributed towards it. To begin
with, there is no clear distinction between local and non-local services. Except for a few items
mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, many basic services assigned to the LBs can be
concurrently delivered by the CG and LBs. It is for this reason that they allocate a great
proportion of their budget in local infrastructure. It is reported that 4 DDCs spent more than 60
percent of their budget in physical infrastructure (LBFC, 2004). In recent years, the LBs are
16

found to be providing grants to the schools and health facilities being run by the central
government. However, they seem to be reluctant to allocate in areas other than physical
infrastructure.
Second, the LBs are not considered as service providers, rather they are regarded as
development agents. Although the preamble of the LSGA refers about the role of the local bodies
on this matter, it focuses the LBs role in development rather than in local service delivery (GoN
and ADB, 2008). Some argue that perhaps devolution is an instrument of local development
rather than a means of empowering service delivery mechanisms at local level (GoN and ADB,
2008).
Third, there is the issue of capacity. In recent years, in particular after the promulgation
of the LSGA, the LBs are assigned more functions and revenues without corresponding increase
in capacity to deliver on their mandate. The present administrative structure of the LBs was
created long ago when they existed as local political units of the then regime. Since then there
has been considerable change in their roles and responsibilities. As a result, they are overly
burdened with their responsibilities. This is particularly an issue in many VDCs (GON & ADB,
2008; LBFC, 2004). Actually, the VDCs are virtually run by secretaries with non-officer level.
As for DDCs, the LSGA envisages to have line offices in agriculture, health, and education,
which has not yet been materialized. So much so, the district technical offices (DTOs) originally
created as technical sections of the DDCs are being developed as technical wings of the Ministry
of Local Development (MoLD) (GoN & ABD, 2008).
Fourth, the VDC's role in providing basic services is not clear. VDCs are the lowest level
of local governments considered “viable jurisdictions of service delivery” and as such should
17

play a key role in providing basic services in their respective areas. Whereas the DDCs’ role
should have been in building their capacity and delivering services that are beyond the VDC's
capacity. Since district headquarters are generally far from VDCs, it is neither convenient for the
citizens to commute to the district headquarters nor the local people have equal access to the
basic services provided to the DDCs. However, more resources and capacity building measures
are centered on DDCs, whereas VDCs are regarded as DDCs' extended arms. DDCs exercise a
great deal of power over the VDCs in budgeting, programing, and staffing. Consequently, the
VDCs have not been able to emerge as local governments that are closest to the people in terms
of efficient entities of basic service delivery.
Presently decentralization is practiced without restructuring the LBs in terms of their
geographical areas. District boundaries were created in the sixties for the ease of the central
government's administration (GoN, and ADB, 2008) and for political reasons (Khanal, 2010),
not with service delivery in mind. Similarly, factors like ethnic, geographical and cultural
homogeneity were not properly considered. In the case of VDCs in particular, all of them have
nine wards irrespective of their population and geographic area; whereas VDCs' population
ranges from 192 to 40,000 people. Some of the VDCs are larger and more resourceful than many
municipalities. With respect to municipalities, many of them were established in recent years on
political bases. With the advancement made in transport and communications, the geographic
divisions of DDCs and VDCS made in the past have become redundant.
This unscientific and impractical organization of the LBs has several implications in
service delivery. People have to travel a long way to meet their district headquarters even if
headquarters of neighboring districts are close by simply because their VDCs belong to different
18

districts. Needless to mention that these people have less access and control over the services
being provided there. Since ethnic, linguistic, socio-cultural factors were not properly taken into
considerations, this also dampened the spirit of decentralization.
In addition to the structure of the LBs, their over dependence on the grants may have
contributed to inefficiencies in service delivery. As alluded to earlier, the LBs have been
receiving a huge sum of amount in the form of grants and have been assigned revenue sources
without clearly spelt out functions and corresponding accountability instruments in place.
Resultantly, the resources are either not properly allocated or not spent economically. For
example, it is found that 60 percent of VDCs allocate grants equally to nine wards (GoN &
ADB, 2008).
Another source of inefficiency of the public service delivery system at the LB level is the
lack of local control over their staff and thus, weak accountability relationships with
clients/citizens. Since the secretaries/chiefs of the LBs are centrally controlled in terms of their
transfer, promotion, dismissal, salary and other pecuniary benefits, there is no incentive for these
officials to be accountable to the LBs' political representatives. As shown in Box 3, chiefs of
staff of the LBs are not regular in their offices. So much so, an X—ray machine was reportedly
being run by a messenger (and not a medical professional) in 2009 (Box 2). Hardly any day goes
by, where it is not reported in national dailies that LBs have been suffering because of staff
absenteeism (Sharma Yam field notes, 2010).
Improper sequencing of the roles and responsibilities of the LBs is another issue of
concern. Principles of fiscal decentralization (ideally) suggest that expenditures should first be
assigned; followed by revenues, intergovernmental grants and borrowing. However, this seems
19

not to have been the case in Nepal. Local bodies were assigned revenues coming from land tax
and were entitled to revenue sharing even before the LSGA came into being. Thus, the revenues
were assigned without the LBs properly being mandated for defined functions (LBFC, 2004).
This was further exacerbated as the government started proving a substantial amount of grants to
LBs since fiscal year 1995/96. This in part may explain why LBs allocate their budgets
inefficiently and spend inappropriately. Local bodies are yet to fully be institutions of service
delivery as the CG still plays a significant role in delivering basic local services (LBFC, 2004). A
shift has not happened moving the LBs from the periphery to having even greater impact on the
daily lives of the ordinary citizens through efficient service delivery. Perhaps this may explain
why the people did not feel the absence of the elected representatives in their LBs for a long time
(LBFC, 2004).
In conclusion, despite the recent efforts to improve access and quality of service delivery,
Nepal is yet to reach a more desired and efficient model in which citizen priorities and needs are
provided by their jurisdictions. The central government still occupies center stage in basic
service delivery. Yet, for some of these services, the LBs are better situated to provide them and
perhaps higher level local governments where services with greater economies of scale are
involved. The role of LBs remains limited in part due to weak administrative capacity to manage
and implement government programmes. Enhancing the roles of the LBs to efficiently deliver
basic services will require a shift in the current paradigm. In the next section, we discuss some of
the possible measures toward a perhaps more efficient and equitable model that upholds (to some
extent) on the accountability model laid out above.
5.

Conclusion
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Constitutional guarantee of local governments. Local governments (LGs) need to
constitutionally form a tier of government headed by elected representatives. With this, the local
governments will unlikely be victims of vagaries of the central and state governments.
Clear expenditure assignments. Local governments ought to be mandated to provide basic
local public goods. In this regard, the expenditures of the LGs should be clearly assigned.
Perhaps not all expenditure responsibilities of the LGs need to be listed in the constitution itself.
After assigning certain rights and responsibilities in the constitution, it could be laid down that
the rest will be devolved based on the principle of subsidiarity. This will avoid constitutional
rigidity and at the same time ensure competencies of different tiers of government.
Adequate revenue for the local governments. Unlike in the present, the LGs should be
provided adequate revenue sources. In addition to local taxes, they should be allowed to levy
surcharges in tax revenues like income tax and valued added tax (VAT). This will allow urban
local governments to generate substantial own source revenues.
Principle-based intergovernmental transfer system. Even after assigning substantial
revenue sources to the local governments, it is highly likely that there substantial gap between
the revenue generated and their expenditure needs, particularly in rural areas given the low
revenue potential of rural local governments. This gap will be serviced through transfers from
the federal and state governments. The design of the transfer system will therefore form an
important part of the fiscal federalism agenda in Nepal.
Separate provisions of local governments in rural and urban areas. Given the unevenness
in development and revenue potential between the rural and urban areas, and subsequently,
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administrative and fiscal capacity to deliver on basic public services, separate structures need to
be created between the rural and urban areas. This allows for separate expenditure and revenue
assignments to the LBs. As the local bodies in urban areas will be more capacitated and more
liquid than their counterparts in the rural areas, the municipal bodies can be given more powers
to manage their affairs and state and central governments will put greater emphasis on improving
the capacity of the rural LGs.
Proper accountability structure in place. The constitution should provide for proper and
adequate institutions ensuring accountability of the local governments without which there is no
guarantee that local public service delivery will improve. In this regard, the role of the electoral
system, intergovernmental relations and citizen empowerment in development programs is
critically important. Likewise, fiduciary issues (financial management, procurement, budgeting,
accounting, auditing and reporting) will require focus and clarity across the tiers of government.
Rights to information, including enhanced social accountability mechanisms and cognizance of
environmental and social safeguard issues will be important.
Restructuring of Local Governments. Local Governments will have to be restructured to
render them viable entities. Much has changed in terms of technology, infrastructure and
connectivity since the present form of local bodies, especially districts and VDCs were created
and as such will have to be reflected in the new structure of local governments. The structure of
local governments will have to take into geographical proximity; ethnic, cultural and linguistic
homogeneity; ease of service delivery; economic of scale, and physical infrastructure, among
others.
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Staffing.

Local governments should be allowed to have their own staff that is

accountable to locally elected representatives. This right should not be unconstrained, however.
The LGs should face hard budget constraint; otherwise the central and state governments will
have to bear the brunt of the liabilities created by the LGs. And, the authority to hire own staff
should be guided by clear accountability principles.
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Figure 1: The Long and Short Route of Accountability

Source: World Development Report (2004).
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Table 1. Nepal: Selected subnational revenue data (by Major sources), 2001/02—2006/07.
2001/02
Items
Own Source Revenue
Grant
Total
Own Source Revenue
Grant
Loan
Total

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

Village Development Committees (VDCs)
766
479.6
434.7
534.7
1620
1572
2215.1
2007.5
2386
2051.6
2649.8
2542.2
Municipalities
1368.7
1707.9
1765.5
1933.5
0
23.3
28.8
705.7
0
2.6
2.6
2.4
1368.7
1733.8
1796.9
2641.6

429.5
2189.8
2619.3
1867.9
655.6
3.9
2527.4

1946.4
1099.4
4.7
3050.5
Rs. in
million

518
539
765.9
1822.9

909.1
1091.8
5325.2
7326.1
Rs. in
million
3566.6
5325.2
10591.2
4.7
19487.7

District Development Committees (DDCs)
Own Source Revenue
Revenue Sharing
Grant
Total

Own Revenue
Revenue Sharing
Grant
Loan
Total
% of Grants in Own
Source Tax
Own Source Tax % of
Cental Government
Revenue
Own revenue % GDP
Own Source Local
Tax/Total General
Government Tax
Grant % of Central Govt.
Tax

325.7
1005.9
2736.3
4067.9

492.6
390.3
826.5
1709.4

2006/07
Rs. in
million
711.1
4166.6
4877.7

614.4
417.7
663.4
1695.5

560.8
388.3
747
1696.1

2749.1
663.4
2283.4
0
5695.9

All Local Bodies
2748.3
2525.9
2960.8
2815.4
747
2736.3
826.5
765.9
2342.3
4980.2
3539.7
3611.3
2.6
2.6
2.4
3.9
5840.2
10245
7329.4
7196.5
% Share of the Local Bodies

83.06

85.23

197.17

119.55

128.27

296.96

5.45
0.60

4.89
0.56

4.05
0.47

4.22
0.50

3.90
0.43

4.07
0.49

5.44

4.88

4.04

4.22

3.89

4.05

1.32

1.33

4.39

1.18

1.06

6.07
Rs. in
million
87712.2

Memorandum Items
Central Govt. Revenue
50445.6
56229.7
62331
70122.7
72282.1
General Government
Revenue
50528.66 56314.9272 62528.17 70242.25 72410.37 88009.1551
GDP
459443.0
492231.0 536749.0 589412.0 654055.0
727089.0
Source: Annual Reports of the Local Bodies Fiscal Commission and Economic Survey, Government of Nepal
(2007/08)
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